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Abstract
We generalize the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of the labor market with
a more realistic structure for the stochastic process of the shocks to the worker-rm
match. In this way we can acommodate the empirical observation that hazard rates
of job termination decrease and average wages increase with job tenure. Besides
being able to t better some observables of the model, the changes we introduce are
nontrivial for the analysis of policies as well.
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1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a large body of empirical work which has substantively
increased our knowledge about the facts concerning the performance of labor markets.
One of the main features that arises from this literature is the large extent of labor
reallocation that takes place in most developed economies, most of which is unrelated to
sectoral, geographical or business cycle type shocks. This labor reallocation reects the
fact that opportunities do not arise always in the same places, so labor must be reallocated
from less valuable matches to those that have become more valuable.
Several theoretical models have been used to study labor reallocation. Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) study the hiring and ring decisions of rms which face idiosyncratic and
aggregate uncertainty to the returns to labor. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) incorpo-
rate this structure in a general equilibrium model, calibrating the stochastic process for
rms' productivity to match US evidence on job creation and destruction. Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) use a labor matching model with idiosyncratic shocks to the worker
rm pair and ecient bargaining to study the same issues. Millard and Mortensen (1995)
calibrate a version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model. These models have also
been used to study the eects of labor market policies.
The model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is particularly interesting because it helps
to understand the interplay between bargaining (and therefore wage formation) and the
process of job creation and destruction. In particular, a model with exogenous wages (like
the rst two papers cited) is bound to produce unrealistic conclusions about the eects
of obstacles to labor mobility, since the welfare efects of these obstacles are likely to be
at least partially shared by the agents through the wages.
On the other hand, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Millard and Mortensen (1995)
make a number of simplifying assumptions for reasons of analytical tractability which have
counterfactual implications for the analysis. In particular, the assumptions they make on
the stochastic process for the shocks implies that hazard rates for job termination and
average wages are independent of job tenure. In contrast, empirical work indicates quite
robustly that hazard rates decrease and average wages increase with job tenure. The
theory of job matching developed by Jovanovic (1982) was precisely motivated by this set
of observations.
We extend the Mortensen-Pissarides model along these lines. The probability structure
introduced is almost identical to the one used in Hopenhayn (1992) to explain patterns
of exit and growth of rms which are qualitatively identical to the ones corresponding
to wage growth and job termination.
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Besides being able to t better some observables
of the model, the changes we introduce are nontrivial for the analysis of policies as well.
The calibrated version of the model predicts eects of layo costs that dier from those
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This connection between labor and rm reallocation was recognized in Jovanovic (1982), that applies
a version of the job matching model to study rm dynamics.
obtained by Millard and Mortensen (1995), even though the model and parameters used
are the same except in the probability structure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. A stationary equilibrium
is dened in section 3. Section 4 provides a calibration of the extended Mortensen-
Pissarides model and gives some numerical results.
2 The model
The model we develop is a modied version of the one in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
(subsequently MP). We study an equilibrium process of job creation and job destruction.
Job creation results from a costly process of two-sided matching, where workers and em-
ployers engage in search activities. The jobs that are created after the search process is
completed have a level of productivity that is random and match specic. Once estab-
lished, the productivity of a match evolves according to an exogenous Markov process. As
analyzed below, when a match reaches a low level of productivity, it is destroyed. Jobs are
also continually created as displaced workers look for new jobs and entrepreneurs engage
in new search to create positions.
The basic unit of the model is the worker-employer match, which we will also call job
or position. This match produces a ow of output q(x), which is strictly increasing in
the productivity state of the match x 2 X = [x; x], where x and x are real numbers.
2
.
This state is match specic so if the match is dissolved the position becomes eectively
destroyed.
When the rm and the worker meet they form an impression of what the match produc-
tivity would be if they were to write a contract. They will use this information to decide
whether to write the contract or not. This is an important consideration because the
contracts that we are going to study have a mandated termination cost, and the level of
match productivity that is demanded to start a relationship (when termination costs do
not have to be paid) may be dierent from the productivity necessary to continue with
an ongoing relationship. More precisely, once a worker and a employer meet, and prior
to entering a contract, they receive a signal y 2 Y = [y; y] about the initial productivity
of the match. This signal is drawn from a probability distribution G
s
(y). The stochastic
process for productivity x evolves as follows. The initial productivity of the match is
drawn from some probability distribution, G
I
(xjy), which depends on the signal received
by employer and worker. We assume that G
I
(xjy
0
) rst order stochastically dominates
G
I
(xjy
00
) when y
0
> y
00
(that is, G
I
(xjy) is a decreasing function of y). This productivity
is not known until the vacancy is lled. In particular, it could be that x = y with prob-
ability 1, or it could be that x is independent of y. The evolution of productivity from
that point on follows a Poisson jump process. New shocks arrive at a rate , and when
2
An innite state space can be easily handled if q(x) is a bounded function
1
they arrive the new value of the state is drawn from a probability distribution F (xjx
0
)
where x
0
is the previous value of productivity.
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We also assume that F (xjx
0
) rst order
stochastically dominates F (xjx
00
) when x
0
> x
00
. Aside from the endogenous termination
rule which will be discussed below, separations occur exogenously at rate :
Matches provide a ow of benets to the worker and the rms, contingent on the produc-
tivity of the match x:We will denote by w (x) the gross wage received by the worker, which
is determined below. The net income ow to the worker, denoted by 
w
(x;w (x)), where

w
,is a continuously dierentiable function, increasing in its rst and second arguments.
MP have 
w
(x;w (x)) = w(x), and Millard and Mortensen (1995) have 
w
(x;w (x)) =
(1   t
w
)w(x), where t
w
is a wage tax paid by the worker. The prot ow obtained from
this match by the rm is 
f
(x;w (x)), where 
f
,is a continuously dierentiable function,
increasing in its rst argument and decreasing in the second. MP have 
f
(x;w (x)) =
x w(x), and Millard and Mortensen (1995) have 
w
(x;w (x)) = x  (1  t
f
)w(x), where
t
f
is a payroll tax paid by the rm. We assume that both the owners of the rm and
workers are risk neutral and discount future ows at a common interest rate r:
The rate at which the stock of posted vacancies v and the stock of unemployed workers
u meet is given by a function m
a
(v; u; e), where e is the eort made by the worker in the
search process. The function m
a
is increasing in the three arguments and homogeneous
of degree one in v and u. The rate at which workers meet vacancies is
m
a
(v;u;e)
u
. By
the assumption of constant returns in matching, this can be written m
a
(
v
u
; 1; e). Letting
 = v=u; the matching technology can thus be described m
a
(
v
u
; 1; e) = m(; e). Letting
y

be the minimum level of the signal above which the initial match is formed and x

the minimum productivity level that makes continuing the match desirable
4
, () =
m(; e)(
R
y>y

(1 G
I
(x

jy))dG
s
(y)) is the rate at which workers escape from unemployment
and 1=() the average duration of the unemployment spell. By the constant returns to
scale assumption, and since all workers choose the same eort level in equilibrium and
thus e is both the individual and average eort level, ()= is the rate at which vacancies
are lled.
We assume that all separations between rms and workers are permanent. The termina-
tion value for the rm (which may depend continuously on x

; y

and ) is denoted by T .
The termination value for the worker (which may also depend continuously on x

; y

and
) is denoted by B. The value of search for an unemployed worker is denoted by U:
Let V (x) denote the value to a rm of having a match with productivity x and x

be the
level of productivity below which a match is terminated.
This value satises the following dynamic programming equation:
rV (x) = 
f
(x;w (x)) + 

Z
x
0
>x

V (x
0
)dF (x
0
jx)  F (x

jx)T   V (x)

  V (x) (1)
3
MP assume F (xjx
0
) = F (x): They also assume that F (x) is a uniform distribution and G(x) has unit
mass at the upper end of the support of F (x).
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In the steady state -as is analyzed in the paper- these exit points are time independent.
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The ow value rV (x) for this rm consists of: i) the net prot ow; ii) the capital gain
(or loss) associated to a change in productivity if the new productivity x
0
exceeds the
cuto level x

; iii) the termination value T if the new shock is below x

and iv) the loss
of all value if the match is exogenously terminated.
Notice that this denition implicitly assumes that the value function is increasing in x,
since the termination rule for the rms is assumed to be monotone. This is valid since
for the wage rate w(x) that will be specied later, 
w
(x;w (x)) is increasing in x and
because of the rst order stochastic dominance relation satised by F (x
0
jx) (see theorem
9.11, Stokey and Lucas, 1989).
In turn the value for the workerW (x) satises the following dynamic programming equa-
tion:
rW (x) = 
w
(x;w (x))+

Z
x
0
>x

W (x
0
)dF (x
0
jx) + F (x

jx)(U +B) W (x)

+(U W (x)):
(2)
The interpretation of this equation is analogous to the one given for the rm's value.
Notice that the value of an endogenous termination for the worker is U + B, consisting
of the option value of unemployment plus the displacement transfers B: These transfers
are assumed to be zero for an exogenous displacement.
The expected initial value for a worker of a match with signal y, W
s
(y) and the asset
value of search for an unemployed worker U(e) for a given level of search eort e are given
by:
W
s
(y) =
Z
x>x

W (x)dG
I
(xjy) +G
I
(x

jy)(U +B) (3)
rU(e) = b  e+m(; e)

Z
y>y

W
s
(y)dG
s
(y) +G
s
(y

)U   U(e)

(4)
Then we dene U = max
e
U(e) and e

= arg maxU(e).
The expected initial value for an employer of a match with signal y, V
s
(y) and the value
V
e
of posting a vacancy for a rm are given by
V
s
(y) =
Z
x>x

V (x)dG
I
(xjy) G
I
(x

jy)T + V
e
G
I
(x

jy) (5)
rV
e
=  c+
m(; e

)


Z
y>y

V
s
(y)dG
s
(y)

  V
e
(1  G
s
(y

))

(6)
These denition assume that the point at which a rm has to incur the layo costs if it
wants to re a worker occurs after the signal y is revealed.
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2.1 Bargaining process
The match-specic nature of productivity creates at each instant a bargaining situation
between entrepreneur and worker. The approach followed is that the wage rate must be
such that total surplus will be divided in proportions that depend on the (exogenously
given) bargaining power of the partners. This results from Nash's (1953) bargaining
solution which maximizes the product of the utilities minus the values of termination of
the relationship for the players. The proportion that goes to the worker is denoted .
We assume that all separations are interpreted as rings, so that the disagreement value
of the worker is B + U and the disagreement value of the rm is  T . This gives more
bargaining power to the workers and a smaller expected value for rms. This leads
to less job creation which is the channel through which layo costs will lead to higher
unemployment. Burda (1992) makes the opposite assumption, all separations that are
not exogenous are interpreted as quits, and layo costs (which in his model are only
obtained after an exogenous separation) have no eects on unemployment since the layo
cost is considered by the bargaining pair as part of the workers' value and the wage is
reduced accordingly. In our model the assumption that separations are interpreted as
rings is more sensible that in Burda's model because in our model, unlike in his, we have
idiosyncratic match productivity, which is not veriable. A worker that wants to quit
and obtain the layo compensation can lower the productivity level of the match below
x

and make the match undesirable enough that even paying the layo compensation is
justied.
The Nash bargaining solution prescribes that the wage proposed in a given date and for
a given productivity maximizes
(W (x)  (B + U))

(V (x) + T )
1 
(7)
This implies that
(1   )
f
2
(x;w (x)) (W (x)  (B + U)) = 
w
2
(x;w (x)) (V (x) + T ) (8)
Equations (1) and (2) imply
(r +  + )(V (x) + T ) = 
f
(x;w (x)) + (r + )T + 

Z
x
0
>x

(V (x
0
) + T )dF (x
0
jx)

(9)
(r + + )(W (x)  (B + U)) = 
w
2
(x;w(x))  (r + )(B + U) + U
+

Z
x
0
>x

(W (x
0
)  (B + U))dF (x
0
jx)

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If we premultiply equation (9) by 
w
2
(x;w (x)) premultiply (10) by (1 )
f
2
(x;w (x))and
then subtract one from the other we obtain:
J(x;w(x)) = 
w
2
(x;w (x))


f
(x;w (x)) + (r + )T

+(1   )
f
2
(x;w (x)) (
w
(x;w (x))  (r + )(U +B) + U) = 0
(10)
In the particular case where 
f
(x;w (x)) = x   w(x) and 
w
(x;w (x)) = w(x) we have
that J(x;w(x)) = 0 implies
w(x) = (x+ (r + )T ) + (1  )(rU + (r + )B)
.
J(x;w(x)) = 0 denes implicitly the wage schedule. We will make certain assumptions
on J to guarantee that the wage schedule satises some desirable properties.
W1 For any xed values U;B; T there is somew
m
with J(x;w
m
) > 0; J(x;1) < 0; J
2
(x;w) <
0; for all x;w:
W2  J
1
(x;w)=J
2
(x;w) > 0 for all x;w:
W3 
f
1
(x;w (x))  
f
2
(x;w (x)) J
1
(x;w)=J
2
(x;w) > 0 for all x;w:
If W1 is satised 10 denes uniquely the wage for each x. If W2 is satised then the wage
rate is increasing in x, which is necessary for the denition of W (x): If W3 is satised
then the prot ow of the rm is increasing in x, which is necessary for the denition
of V (x): It is easy to check that W1, W2 and W3 are satised for the specications of

f
(x;w (x)) and 
w
(x;w (x)) used by MP and Millard and Mortensen (1995).
3 Stationary Equilibrium
The assumption of Nash bargaining implies that termination of the match is ecient for
the rm/worker match. Matches are terminated when the state is such that total surplus
is zero, The separation state x

must then satisfy:
V (x

) + T +W (x

)  (U +B) = 0 (11)
or given that (8) has to be satised
V (x

) + T = 0: (12)
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If V (x) <  T for all x then x

= x, and all matches are immediately destroyed. If
V (x) >  T for all x then x

= x, and matches are only destroyed at the exogenous rate
.
Notice that since V and W are strictly increasing functions, x

will be uniquely deter-
mined, for a given .
The signal y

was dened as the minimum signal that makes both agents interested in
entering a contract. To make the initiation of the relationship individually rational y

has
to satisfy
minfW
s
(y

)  U; V
s
(y

)g = 0: (13)
If minfW
s
(y

)   U; V
s
(y

)g < 0 for all y then y

= y, and no matches are created. If
minfW
s
(y

)   U; V
s
(y

)g > 0 for all y then y

= y, and for all initial productivities the
match is transformed in a contrast. The reason why we need to express the condition as
the minimumof two values is that, unlike in the denition of x

we do not have a guarantee
that both values are equal or, in other words, we do no have a guarantee that initiation
of the match is ecient. This is so because there is no way to arrange transfers between
the agents without writing a contract, but that is precisely what they are deciding.
Another assumption which we will use in the determination of an equilibrium is that there
is free entry (except for the vacancy posting costs), new vacancies will be posted until
V
e
= 0 or
V
s
(y) =
Z
x>x

V (x)dG
I
(xjy) G
I
(x

jy)T (14)
0 =  c+
m(; e

)


Z
y>y

V
s
(y)dG
s
(y)

 G
s
(y

)T

(15)
If V
e
< 0 for all values of x

and  then no vacancies are created and  = 0. Since
productivity is bounded we will see that V (x) is bounded, so it cannot be the case that
V
e
is always positive.
Since m(; e

) is an increasing function of ; given values V (x) and the exit rule, this
denition uniquely determines :
In a stationary equilibrium the rate of match separation must equal the rate of match
creation so that the total stock of matches remains constant. Exit can thus be thought
of as a renewal process which switches positions that become unproductive or that are
exogenously destroyed into new ones, sampled from the distribution G
I
; conditional on
the set fx > x

g and on the set of signals y > y

sampled from the distribution G
s
.
For any xed separation rule x

, and assuming the expectation of the stopping time
associated to x

is nite
5
, this process has a unique invariant distribution over productivity
5
This condition is discussed in detail in Hopenhayn (1992 )
6
states  (x

) : Letting  (x

) denote the expected duration of the match associated to this
separation rule and u the rate of unemployment, the hazard rate for match termination
at the invariant distribution is 1= (x

) and thus the rate of escape of employment can be
shown to be equal to (1  u) = (x

) :
6
In turn, the rate of match creation is given by ()u:
The requirement that creation ows balance out with match destruction ows implies that
(1   u) = (x

) = ()u (16)
A stationary equilibrium is given by the functions V (x) ; W (x) and w (x) ; together with
scalars U; x

; y

; e

;  and u that satisfy equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (10), (16),
and the denitions of x

, y

, U, e

, and .
Proposition 1 Assume that F (x
0
jx) has the Feller property, m(; e) is a continuous
function, which is bounded in e for all  and is such that for all e lim
!1
m(;e)

= 0, then
there is a stationary equilibrium.
7
Proof: See the Appendix.
3.1 Wage and employment dynamics
In this section we provide conditions under which average wages increase and hazard rates
for job destruction decrease as a function of job tenure. Remember that by assumption
W2 wages are strictly increasing in the state x. This means that if the distribution of
matches that survive t periods stochastically dominates the distribution of matches that
survives s < t periods, the average wage of workers with t years of tenure will be higher
than the average wage of workers with s < t years of tenure.
The following assumptions provide sucient conditions for the distribution of matches of
type x that have survived t years, 
t
(x) to dominate stochastically 
s
(x), when s < t.
A.1 F (xjx
0
) is decreasing in x
0
and jointly continuous.
A.2 G
I
is continuous.
A.3
R
F (x
0
jx)dG
I
(xjy)  G
I
(x
0
) for all x
0
; y 2 X.
A.4 i) 8y 2 X and x
0
 z, i) [F (x
0
jx)  F (zjx)]=[1  F (zjx)] is decreasing in x;
ii)
R
x
0
z
F (x
0
jx)dG
I
(xjy)  G
I
(x
0
jy)[1  F (zjx)]=[1 G
I
(zjy)].
6
See Hopenhayn (1992 ) for details.
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Notice that a special case of the proposition holds when the matching function m
a
is independent
of v, and the parameters c = 0,  = 1 and T = 0, which corresponds to a pure search model (by the
worker), connected for example to the work of Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Diamond (1982).
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Assumption A.1 says that higher values of x
0
leads to a conditional distribution that puts
more weight on higher values of x. Assumption A.3 says that the initial realization of the
shock is on average worse than the ones that come later. This assumption contrasts with
the one in MP, who assume that the initial shock comes at the top of the distribution of
subsequent shocks. Assumption A.4 i) is the analog of assumption A.1 for a distribution of
shocks, conditional on an exit rule that eliminates shocks with values z
0
< z. Assumption
A.4 ii) is the analog of A3 for a distribution of shocks, conditional on an exit rule that
eliminates shocks with values z
0
< z.
Lemma 1 in Hopenhayn (1992) shows that under assumptions A.1 to A.4 the distribution
of matches that survive from time s to time t conditional on any number of shocks
j
st
, 
t
(xjj
st
) stochastically dominates 
s
(x) for all j
st
. Therefore 
t
(x) stochastically
dominates 
s
(x).
8
This stochastic dominance result implies that wages increase and hazard rates for match
destruction decrease with the length of job tenure.
Other properties of the equilibrium that are of interest concern the average values of
rms and workers. Those are useful because when the model is calibrated one would like
to match some moments of observables, and since the values of rms that are typically
accessible are the averages (not the expectations) those are the ones whose match will be
attempted, and we would like to know their relationship with other equilibrium values.
Let 
t
be the probability that a match has at least a duration of t. The average value
of a rm of age t is V
t
=
R
x
0
>x

V (x
0
)d
t
(x
0
). The average value of rms in the industry
is thus V =
R
1
0

t
V
t
=
R
1
0

t
. If 
t
(x) dominates stochastically G
I
(xjy) we have that
V >
R
x
0
>x

V (x
0
)dG
I
(xjy).
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate the model presented in the previous sections to US data
in order to assess the eects of changes in the policy parameters on the equilibrium
values for employment, turnover and wages. Our approach will be to try to follow the
parametrization of Millard and Mortensen (1995) as close as possible, so that our results
can be compared to theirs. This will provide a measure of the sensitivity of the model to
the specic assumptions about the stochastic process for job productivity.
The time unit in the model is a quarter and all ows will be reported in per quarter terms.
The rate of interest is r = 0:01. The exogenous rate of attrition (quit to unemployment),
 = 0:015. The matching function m() = 

, where  = 0:6. We normalize all values of
8
As shown in Hopenhayn (1992) conditions A.1 to A.4 are satised if F (x
0
jx) follows an AR1 process
x
0
= x+ , where 0 <  < 1 and  is normally distributed with mean  and variance 
2

> 0, and G is a
normal distribution with mean x
0
< =(1  ) and variance 
2

=(1  
2
).
8
productivity to a numeraire which will be the long run value of output. The training cost
and recruiting cost gures must be interpreted in terms of this numeraire. The vacancy
cost c = 0:33 and the training cost k = 0:275. The bargaining power of the worker is
 = 0:3. The specic values chose are justied in Millard and Mortensen (1995).
We now consider the policy parameters. The social security taxes are t
f
= 0:075 and
t
w
= 0:075. The number of quarters during which unemployment insurance is received is
2. The average replacement ratio of unemployment insurance is 25%, the product of the
mandated replacement ratio, which is 50% and the percentage of people who qualify for
the benets, around 50%. Severance pay in the US is zero, but there is a cost of layo
since employers pay an average of about 60 cents for each additional dollar that former
employees receive in the form unemployment insurance.
The values of the remaining parameters are chosen to obtain an adequate t with values
of unemployment duration, incidence and the existing estimates of the eects of tenure
on wage proles and hazard rates of termination of the employment.
In our calibration  = 0:15. This implies the arrival of shocks in our model is more
frequent than in Millard and Mortensen (1995) who use  = 0:1. Notice that in our
model, unlike in theirs, there are two measures of persistence of shocks, namely,  the
parameter that controls their rate of arrival and  the parameter that weights the last
value of the shock in the autoregressive process that controls the value of the shock once
it arrives. We also make the value of leisure, b = 0:37.
The stochastic process assumed for the shocks is an AR(1) with normal innovations. The
persistence of the shocks we impose is  = 0:80. The mean of the innovation is 0.025.
The variance of the innovation is 1.2. As for the initial value of productivity we assume
a normal distribution with mean 0.11 and variance 0.05.
The benchmark values obtained for our simulations are shown in table A.1. A comparison
with US data shows that the t for the incidence of unemployment and duration are
adequate. The qualitative picture of dynamics is as we predicted. A comparison of
the evolution of wages with tenure and the rates of growth obtained from Topel (1991),
reported on Table A.2 shows a remarkable approximation. The variance of wages grows
with tenure (after the second year) which also squares with available evidence. The
qualitative features of the hazard rates of separations, decreasing hazards and decreasing
rate of change, are also similar to available estimates (see McLaughlin 1991). Inspection
of the invariant distribution (Table A.1.a) shows that the distribution of wages is quite
skewed.
Two policy experiments were performed and the results are reported in tables A.3. and
A.4. Table A.3. reports the calibration for the economy where a severance payment
of 0.28, around a month of mean wages. Consistently with the ndings of Millard and
Mortensen (1995) the eect on unemployment is rather sizable, but in our case the in-
crease in unemployment is dramatic, almost 6 percentage points compared with about
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2.2 percentage points in their case. The dierence can be explained because in our case
the increase in unemployment comes largely through an increase in its duration, since
the eect on the rate of separations is negligible. In Mortensen and Millard's case there
was also a reduction in the rate of turnover that mitigated the eect of a lower rate of
employment creation. Since salary dispersion is relatively low for Mortensen and Millard's
calibration, there is a high density at every point of the distribution of qualities. When the
cuto point for the destruction of employment falls, lots of workers that otherwise would
have been laid o are kept employed. In our case however, the fall aects substantially
fewer workers because the distribution is far more disperse around the cuto point. This
is an example of a seemingly harmless assumption with drastic implications in the policy
analysis.
Besides the eect on unemployment, the layo compensation raises wages as a reection
of the increased bargaining power of workers. The value of an employed worker, W (x) ;
shows that all employed workers benet from the severance pay. The eect is negative
for the rms, whose value decrease and for the unemployed.
The second policy experiment (Table A.4) performed is given by a suppression of the
payroll tax. Our results show a relatively low decrease in the unemployment rate as the
tax is eliminated. The turnover rate changes by a very small amount. In this case the
productivity increases since less of it leaks to the government, and this induces large
increases in value of around 15%. The qualitative dynamic gures are almost the same.
One conclusion from these experiments is that this type of models is rather sensitive to
modeling details. The change in the value of leisure, and the specication of a dierent
stochastic process for the shocks are not merely an instrument to match a few extra
observables, like hazard rates of employment and wage proles; they have implications on
the eects of policies and therefore they should be considered carefully when specifying
the model.
5 Conclusions
We have shown in this paper that it is easy to extend the model of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) to account for several empirical observations in labor markets. The
model is useful because it is manageable and it provides insights into the workings of the
labor markets and the eects of policies, but the conclusions seem to be sensitive to the
precise specication chosen. For this reason further research into these issues would be
necessary to know the extent to which the conclusions here would need to be modied.
A point that should be mentioned is that since the quality of workers is only match
dependent we cannot explain decreasing hazard rates for unemployment. It is probable
that the reason why the long term unemployed are less likely to nd employment is a
sorting argument similar to the one we use to explain the hazard rates for employment.
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People with longer unemployment tend to be less skilled. We would need to have a quality
variable for people that were somewhat independent of the match they are in.
It is interesting to note that turnover is almost unaected by many changes in policy
parameters. This is due to the fact that with Nash bargaining termination of the match
is ecient and creation of matches is more aected than destruction. There is some
separation between production and match technology. This feature would disappear if
there were a resource that were used by both technologies, say in a general equilibrium
model where capital could be used to improve the matching technology so that there were
certain substitutability between production and matching.
Another extension to the model would contemplate the state of the match as a result
of learning about its intrinsic quality, not of shocks to productivity. That leads to a
stochastic process for the state of the match that is a martingale.
Finally, it would be interesting to know what are the eects of policy in a context with risk
averse agents. This is important because for some types of policy, like the unemployment
insurance or the layo compensation the insurance motive appears to be very important,
and an adequate assessment of the impact of this policy should consider agents who are
risk averse.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The rst step in showing that a stationary equilibrium exists is to show that the value
functions are continuous and well dened.
With assumptions (W1), (W2) and (W3) we obtain w(x) as a continuous function of ,
x

, and U if m() is continuous.
Lemma 1 Assume that F (x
0
jx) has the Feller property. Then the V (x) and W (x) are well
dened, continuous functions of x.
Proof:
We can write the operator that denes V (x) as
(TV )(x) =
Z
x
0
>x

H(x; x
0
; V (x
0
))dF (x
0
jx); 8x 2 X (17)
whereH(x; x
0
; V (x
0
)) =

+r+
(
f
(x;w (x))=(1 F (x

jx))+V (x
0
)+T ). H : XX<! <
is a continuous function, which is also continuously dierentiable in V and H
3
(x; x
0
; y) =

+r+
< 1. Since F has the Feller property, all the assumptions for Lemma 17.1 in Stokey,
Lucas (1989) are satised and so the operator we use to dene V has a unique xed point
in the space of continuous functions. Thus V is well dened and continuous. The proof
for W is analogous.2
Notice also that V (x) is a continuous function of x

and U (it depends on U through the
salary w(x)) and W (x) is a continuous function of x

and U . Since V (x) and W (x) are
continuous so are V
s
(y) and W
s
(y).
By equation (4) we can write
U(e) =
1
r +m(; e)

b  e+m(; e)

Z
y>y

W
s
(y)dG
s
(y) +G
s
(y

)U

(18)
U(e) is a bounded, continuous function of e and therefore it has a maximum. It is also
continuous in , x

, y

, and U by the continuity of W
s
(y) in those variables. These
continuity is inherited by the maximum. Let D(x

; y

; ; U) = max
e
U(e).
Lemma 2 Assume that F (x
0
jx) has the Feller property, m(; e) is a continuous function
such that lim
!1
m(;e)

= 0, and X = [x; x], there are values  2 [0;1), y

2 Y , x

2 X
and U that satisfy jointly their denitions.
Proof:
Let rst  2 [0; ], with  such that for all e
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m(; e)


f
(x; 0)
r + 
< c: (19)
The  exists because 
f
(x; 0) is nite and because of the assumption on m(; e)=.
We have shown that W and V are well dened continuous functions. Let the function
A(x

; ; U) = x

 minfmaxfV (x

)+T; x

 xg; x

 xg, B(x

; y

; ; U) = +minfmaxfV
e
 
; 0g;  g, C(x

; y

; ; U) = y

 minfmaxfV
s
(y

); y

 xg; y

 xg, and D(x

; y

; ; U) as
dened above. A xed point of these mappings exists by Brouwer's xed point theorem.2
The only thing that remains to show the existence of a stationary equilibrium is that
 (x

) is nite . Since there is a rate  of exogenous termination at every point in time
 (x

) <
1

.2
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TABLE A.0: Parameters for benchmark case
INSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS
Payroll tax paid by rm = 0.075
Payroll tax paid by worker = 0.075
Quarters of insurance received = 2.00
Average replacement ratio = 0.250
Severance payment = 0.000
Experience rating = 0.600
PARAMETERS FROM MORTENSEN-MILLARD
 = 0.300
 = 0.250
 = 0.015
r = 0.010
c = 0.330
k = 0.275
PARAMETERS OF OUR CALIBRATION
Utility from leisure = 0.000
Variance of innovation = 0.650
Persistence = 0.950
Mean of innovation = 0.001
Variance of initial distribution = 0.250
Mean of initial distribution = 0.004
16
TABLE A.1: Benchmark
RESULTS
Turnover rate = 0.059705
Mean wage = 0.84324
Mean duration = 0.99224
Rate of unemployment = 0.055929
Mean shock = 1.0955
Mean value = 86.996
Mean output (net of taxes) = 0.96905
Year Hazard rate Mean wage Wage growth Coef of variation wage
1.0000 0.33643 0.59901 0.11748 0.31731
2.0000 0.28054 0.66939 0.10009 0.25690
3.0000 0.23567 0.73639 0.080430 0.24494
4.0000 0.20242 0.79562 0.063279 0.25951
5.0000 0.17878 0.84596 0.049812 0.28154
6.0000 0.16216 0.88810 0.039597 0.30302
7.0000 0.15040 0.92327 0.031852 0.32174
8.0000 0.14194 0.95268 0.025896 0.33748
9.0000 0.13572 0.97735 0.021234 0.35057
10.000 0.13106 0.99810 0.017524 0.36143
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TABLE A.1.a: Stationary distribution of shocks, values and wages
Shock Density Value of rm Walue of worker Wages Output
0.012267 1.1075 70.762 70.802 0.54093 -0.068872
0.031151 1.1079 70.934 70.848 0.54620 -0.050779
0.064482 1.0972 71.245 70.932 0.55550 -0.018844
0.11320 1.0574 71.714 71.059 0.56910 0.027834
0.17527 0.97352 72.339 71.227 0.58642 0.087302
0.25269 0.83893 73.161 71.448 0.60803 0.16149
0.34196 0.68048 74.167 71.719 0.63294 0.24702
0.44626 0.53301 75.421 72.057 0.66204 0.34695
0.56063 0.43493 76.892 72.453 0.69396 0.45654
0.68917 0.38335 78.661 72.930 0.72984 0.57970
0.82608 0.35841 80.672 73.472 0.76804 0.71087
0.97558 0.33815 83.007 74.101 0.80976 0.85411
1.1319 0.31494 85.589 74.797 0.85340 1.0039
1.2986 0.28763 88.481 75.576 0.89990 1.1636
1.4708 0.25858 91.602 76.417 0.94798 1.3286
1.6505 0.22912 94.981 77.327 0.99811 1.5008
1.8346 0.20082 98.555 78.290 1.0495 1.6772
2.0229 0.17429 102.31 79.301 1.1020 1.8576
2.2144 0.14986 106.21 80.352 1.1555 2.0411
2.4070 0.12780 110.20 81.427 1.2092 2.2256
2.6009 0.10800 114.27 82.525 1.2634 2.4114
2.7935 0.090605 118.35 83.624 1.3171 2.5960
2.9850 0.075400 122.42 84.721 1.3705 2.7794
3.1733 0.062346 126.43 85.799 1.4231 2.9598
3.3574 0.051257 130.32 86.848 1.4745 3.1363
3.5371 0.041898 134.07 87.859 1.5246 3.3084
3.7093 0.034152 137.61 88.812 1.5727 3.4734
3.8760 0.027694 140.95 89.711 1.6192 3.6331
4.0323 0.022471 143.99 90.530 1.6628 3.7829
4.1818 0.018165 146.78 91.284 1.7045 3.9261
4.3187 0.014760 149.24 91.945 1.7427 4.0573
4.4473 0.011992 151.44 92.539 1.7786 4.1805
4.5616 0.0098543 153.31 93.042 1.8105 4.2901
4.6659 0.0081523 154.93 93.479 1.8396 4.3900
4.7552 0.0068711 156.26 93.836 1.8645 4.4755
4.8326 0.0058830 157.36 94.132 1.8862 4.5497
4.8947 0.0051690 158.20 94.361 1.9035 4.6092
4.9434 0.0046549 158.85 94.534 1.9171 4.6559
4.9767 0.0043257 159.28 94.650 1.9264 4.6878
4.9956 0.0041470 159.52 94.715 1.9316 4.7059
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TABLE A.2: Growth rate of wages with tenure
Topel This paper
0.117 0.117
0.102 0.100
0.088 0.080
0.075 0.063
0.065 0.050
0.055 0.040
0.048 0.032
0.041 0.026
0.036 0.018
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TABLE A.3: First policy experiment
CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS
Severance payment = 0.270
RESULTS
Turnover rate = 0.059639
Mean wage = 0.84828
Mean duration = 1.4266
Rate of unemployment = 0.078408
Mean shock = 1.0942
Mean value = 86.728
Mean output (net of taxes) = 0.96701
Year Hazard rate Mean wage Wage growth Coef of variation wage
1.0000 0.33613 0.60399 0.11649 0.31492
2.0000 0.28031 0.67435 0.099315 0.25518
3.0000 0.23549 0.74132 0.079861 0.24341
4.0000 0.20229 0.80052 0.062871 0.25793
5.0000 0.17868 0.85085 0.049517 0.27989
6.0000 0.16208 0.89299 0.039379 0.30130
7.0000 0.15033 0.92815 0.031688 0.31997
8.0000 0.14187 0.95756 0.025770 0.33567
9.0000 0.13566 0.98224 0.021136 0.34874
10.000 0.13101 1.0030 0.017447 0.35958
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TABLE A.4: Second policy experiment
CHANGES IN PARAMETERS
Wage tax paid by rm = 0.0000
Wage tax paid by worker = 0.0000
RESULTS
Turnover rate = 0.059668
Mean wage = 0.90560
Mean duration = 0.98157
Rate of unemployment = 0.055328
Mean shock = 1.0948
Mean value = 99.111
Mean output (net of taxes) = 1.0948
Year Hazard rate Mean wage Wage growth Coef of variation wage
1.0000 0.33626 0.64302 0.11764 0.31790
2.0000 0.28041 0.71866 0.10020 0.25733
3.0000 0.23557 0.79067 0.080508 0.24529
4.0000 0.20234 0.85432 0.063339 0.25981
5.0000 0.17872 0.90844 0.049860 0.28182
6.0000 0.16212 0.95373 0.039637 0.30330
7.0000 0.15036 0.99153 0.031885 0.32201
8.0000 0.14190 1.0232 0.025924 0.33775
9.0000 0.13569 1.0497 0.021258 0.35084
10.000 0.13103 1.0720 0.017545 0.36171
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